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The Economic Perspective on Sentencing
Joshua B. Fischman*
Although economists have been actively engaged in research on
criminal sentencing, the synergies between the two fields are hardly
obvious. This Essay considers what economists have to contribute to
the study of sentencing. One common explanation—that economists’
use of rational choice modeling has applicability to the study of
deterrence—does not adequately account for much of the sentencing
research that economists are producing.
This Essay considers two alternative explanations. First, empirical
research in both fields is predominately observational. Due to practical
limits on controlled experimentation, economists have developed a
variety of tools for making causal inferences from observational data,
many of which have also proved useful in the study of criminal
sentencing. Second, both fields are policy-oriented social sciences.
Methods developed by economists for relating data to theoretical
normative constructs, such as surplus and social welfare, have also
proven useful in sentencing research, particularly in the study of interjudge disparity.
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it does not seem unusual to hold a panel discussion on “The Economics
of Sentencing.”1 But what exactly is “The Economics of Sentencing”?
It is quite apparent that economists have made important contributions
to sentencing research in recent years, but it is less clear why
economists study sentencing. According to the New Oxford American
Dictionary, economics is “the branch of knowledge concerned with the
production, distribution, consumption, and transfer of wealth.”2 The
Dictionary defines criminal sentences as the judicial determinations of
“punishment assigned to a defendant found guilty” of crimes.3 On the
basis of these traditional definitions, it is not at all obvious that
economists would have much to contribute to the study of sentencing.
In this Essay, I highlight some of the economic literature on crime
and sentencing,4 and consider what is distinctive about economists’
perspectives. There are, of course, narrow areas of overlap between
economics and sentencing, such as how criminal convictions affect
subsequent earnings5 and how neighborhood crime rates affect the
location of businesses.6 The study of criminal deterrence is arguably a
natural fit for economists, insofar as economic models of rational choice
1. This Essay is based on discussions from a panel entitled “The Economics of Sentencing” at
the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal “Sentence Structure: The Elements of Punishment”
Symposium, from Friday, April 4, 2014, at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
2. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 550 (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. Lindberg
eds., 3d ed. 2010).
3. Id. at 1591.
4. I do not attempt to provide a full-length overview of economic research on crime and
sentencing. For more comprehensive treatments, see, e.g., Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin,
The Deterrent Effect of Imprisonment, in CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS
43, 43–94 (Philip J. Cook et al. eds., 2011) (describing the state of knowledge regarding the
deterrent effects of imprisonment, as well as implications for policy); Steven D. Levitt & Thomas
J. Miles, Economic Contributions to the Understanding of Crime, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
147 (2006) (studying incentives, causation, public policy, and costs and benefits of crime from an
economic lens); Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment, in
1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 455, 455–95 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007) (reviewing literature in which economists have empirically evaluated or tested the
economic model of criminal behavior); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence: A Review of the Evidence by
a Criminologist for Economists, 5 ANN. REV. ECON. 83 (2013) (highlighting findings regarding
the effects of deterrence and proposing areas of future research); Aaron Chalfin & Justin
McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature (May 9, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Journal of Economic Literature) (reviewing recent economics research
on the effect of deterrence).
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey R. Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 863, 869–72 (2006) (concluding that longer sentences have a positive effect on the
employment and earnings of formerly incarcerated individuals one to two years after release, but
negligible effects seven to nine years after incarceration began).
6. See, e.g., Stuart S. Rosenthal & Amanda Ross, Violent Crime, Entrepreneurship, and
Cities, 67 J. URB. ECON. 135, 144–48 (2010) (examining how business owners consider local
crime rates in selecting locations for commercial establishments).
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can explain how potential offenders respond to the threat of sanctions.
Nevertheless, contemporary economic research on crime and sentencing
extends far beyond the study of deterrence and these narrow areas of
overlap. In my view, economists’ interest in sentencing stems more
from synergies in empirical methodology. In particular, I focus on the
development of methods in empirical economics for making inferences
from observational data, which requires finding naturally occurring
“experiments” and interpreting empirical findings in ways that can be
extrapolated to policy-relevant contexts. Many of these methods have
proved useful not only for answering economic questions, but also for
addressing questions of relevance to sentencing.
Economists bring multiple perspectives to the study of sentencing.
The most obvious is the rational choice perspective—central to much of
economic theory—which can model the decisions of potential
offenders, law enforcement, and actors within the criminal justice
system. This approach contrasts with sociological accounts of crime,
which focus on the influences of peers, social groups, and culture; it is
also in tension with psychological perspectives on crime, which
attribute a larger role to emotion, personality disorders, and mental
illness. Building on a seminal article by Gary Becker,7 many
economists have applied the rational choice model to criminal behavior,
treating potential offenders as rational actors who weigh the costs and
benefits of illegal conduct. Economists have similarly used rational
choice theory to model aspects of the criminal justice process, such as
interactions between potential offenders and law enforcement,8 and
between prosecutors and defense attorneys.9
In my view, however, much of the economic scholarship on
sentencing has only a tenuous connection to rational choice. Indeed,
such models have serious limits as applied to criminal behavior,
especially given the influences of drug use,10 impulsivity,11 and mental

7. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
8. See, e.g., John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and
Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203, 209–15 (2001) (using an empirical model to analyze whether
the higher rate at which police search African-American drivers is due to racial prejudice or an
effort to increase arrests ).
9. See, e.g., Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM.
ECON. REV. 713, 715–23 (1988) (developing a model of plea bargaining in which the prosecution
and defense possess asymmetric information).
10. See Justin McCrary, Dynamic Perspectives on Crime, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF CRIME 83, 83 (Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman eds., 2010) (citing data from the
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (“ADAM”) program of the National Institute of Justice that
shows that roughly two-thirds of arrestees in the United States test positive for one of five major
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illness12 on criminal activity. Other areas of economic research on
sentencing, such as studies of peer effects and inter-judge disparity,
have even weaker connections to rational choice. Instead, many
contributions by economists appear to be driven by similarities between
methodological problems posed by sentencing research and those
familiar to economists.
This Essay discusses two key reasons why econometric methodology
has found wide applicability in sentencing research. First, economics is
predominantly an observational science. While statisticians and some
other social scientists operate predominantly within an experimental
paradigm, examining the impact of treatments that scientists themselves
can manipulate, economists typically study phenomena that cannot be
directly manipulated. Production, consumption, and the functioning of
markets cannot be easily replicated in a laboratory setting. Analogies to
controlled experiments are of limited help in understanding markets,
where prices and output levels are determined by equilibrium
interactions between producers and consumers. Instead, economists
have developed a variety of methods for making causal inferences in
observational contexts, particularly in settings involving two-way or
multidirectional causation. These methods have also proven useful in
studying criminal behavior and the operation of criminal justice.
Second, economics has a strong policy orientation, which has led
economists to develop techniques for bridging the gap between
empirical findings and policy conclusions. Economists often justify
normative claims on the basis of theoretical constructs such as surplus
or social welfare, which do not have simple relationships with
measureable variables.
Rather than letting the data speak for
themselves, economists are more inclined to organize empirical findings
to support specific policy conclusions. Economists may not be
expansive normative theorists—indeed, they sometimes seem to revel in
their disregard for non-utilitarian values13—but they are often quite

drugs).
11. See generally Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 4, at 73 (discussing psychological literature on
crime and impulsivity).
12. See Jillian K. Peterson et al., How Often and How Consistently Do Symptoms Directly
Precede Criminal Behavior Among Offenders with Mental Illness?, 38 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439,
439 (2014) (estimating that 14–16% of prison inmates suffer from some kind of serious mental
illness).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD O. ZERBE, JR., ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 189–
99 (2001) (considering whether rape is an inefficient transaction); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 328 (1978) (discussing
the potential efficiency gains from legalizing the sale of babies); Joel Waldfogel, The Deadweight
Loss of Christmas, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1328, 1330–35 (1993) (measuring the deadweight loss of
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careful about connecting empirical findings to policy conclusions. As I
discuss below, this may explain why economists made key
contributions to the measurement of inter-judge disparity, another
theoretical construct with complex normative and empirical
foundations.
Part I of this Essay discusses the distinction between experimental
and observational approaches to causal inference, and explains why
empirical economics is primarily observational. Part II examines how
observational methods developed by economists have proven useful for
studying the impact of sanctions on crime. Part III discusses the
economic literature on sentencing disparity, highlighting how
economists have taken a rigorous approach to measuring disparity and
relating empirical findings to policy conclusions. Part IV offers a brief
discussion of current challenges in sentencing research, and considers
how we can build upon recent advances.
I. ECONOMICS AS AN OBSERVATIONAL SCIENCE
Empirical social science has long recognized a distinction between
experimental and observational approaches to causal inference. In
experimental approaches—which are dominant in disciplines such as
psychology and biostatistics—researchers assign subjects to treatment
and control groups, typically using a randomized process.
In
observational approaches—which are dominant in economics—
researchers measure the effects of interventions by examining naturally
occurring changes in variables of interest.
The experimental approach has several clear advantages. The first is
that randomization ensures that differences in outcomes can be
attributed to the treatment applied and not to differences in the
composition of the treatment and control groups.14 Thus, experimental
approaches provide the most credible estimates of causal effects.
Second, the researcher may be able to select the type and magnitude of
the treatment that is applied in order to best answer a particular research
question.15 Because observational approaches must rely on naturally

holiday gift exchange).
14. See Daniel E. Ho & Donald B. Rubin, Credible Causal Inference for Empirical Legal
Studies, 7 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 17, 22 (2011) (“Randomization over a large number of units
ensures that treatment and control units are comparable in all respects other than the treatment.”).
15. See Gary Burtless, The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy
Research, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 63, 69 (“[I]n comparison with most sources of
nonexperimental information, experiments permit economists to learn about the effects of a much
wider range of prices and policies.”); see also Jens Ludwig et al., Mechanism Experiments and
Policy Evaluations, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2011, at 17, 30–35 (discussing how to design
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occurring sources of variation, the answers generated may not be
directly responsive to any policy question of interest.
The primary weakness of the experimental approach is its limited
applicability; many important research questions simply cannot be
answered using experimental methods.16 In some cases, there are
ethical barriers.17 For example, one could not test the deterrent effect of
the death penalty by randomizing executions. In other instances, the
barrier is practical. The behavior studied in laboratory experiments may
be too dissimilar from real-world conduct to provide policy-relevant
conclusions,18 or the intended subjects of a study may refuse to
cooperate.19 Experiments conducted in the field may provide greater
realism, but because they are harder to control, they also face greater
risk of contamination due to “subject attrition, crossover between the
treatment and control groups, spillover effects, or even conscious efforts
by nonparticipants to undermine the research.”20
Economists have developed and honed methods for making
observational inferences, in large part because many of their research
questions cannot be studied experimentally. Often, economists are not
seeking to examine a single causal relationship between a treatment and
outcome, but rather, equilibrium interactions involving simultaneous
causation.21 In product markets, for example, prices and quantities are
determined by interactions between supply curves and demand curves.
High prices lead consumers to reduce purchases, but high prices also
induce suppliers to increase output. There is no single causal
relationship between market prices and output levels, but rather

experiments in order to maximize policy-relevant findings).
16. See Joshua B. Fischman, Reuniting ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ in Empirical Legal Scholarship, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 117, 166–67 (2013) (discussing limitations of experimental methods in empirical
legal research).
17. See id. at 166 nn.237–38 (referring to sources examining ethical limitations on intentional
randomization in the legal process).
18. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about the external
validity of laboratory experiments).
19. See Fischman, supra note 16, at 167 n.243 (discussing efforts by judges and lawyers to
undermine randomized studies of the legal system); James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith,
Assessing the Case for Social Experiments, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 85, 104 (1995)
(describing how program administrators can “subvert any randomization imposed upon them”).
20. Fischman, supra note 16, at 167; see also Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing Law,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 957–60 (2011) (discussing attrition, crossover, and spillovers in the
context of randomized trials).
21. See James J. Heckman, Econometric Causality, 76 INT’L STAT. REV. 1, 19–20 (2008)
(contrasting the statistical approach to causality in which “there is no simultaneity in causal
effects,” with the econometric approach, which accounts for simultaneous causation (emphasis
omitted)).
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simultaneous interactions between consumers and producers.
Many statisticians view randomized trials as the “gold standard” for
causal inference,22 viewing observational methods as inferior. When
they must work with observational data, they often apply adjustments to
“mak[e] them more closely resemble randomized experiments.”23
Many economists, however, do not view the randomized trial as an ideal
approach to inference.24 Rather than “start[ing] from the perspective of
a randomized clinical trial, economists start with the notion that
individuals receive the treatments they received because they choose
to.”25 Often, their goal is to estimate parameters that determine agents’
preferences, which can then be used to model their behavior in
counterfactual contexts.26
There are two primary challenges in making causal inferences in
observational contexts. The first is to find naturally occurring sources
of variation in the underlying variables. For example, researchers might
examine the effects of policies that were implemented at different times
in different regions, or sources of arbitrariness—such as just meeting or
just missing a threshold that determines eligibility for a treatment—that
induce quasi-randomness in variables of interest.27 The second
22. See Donald B. Rubin, For Objective Causal Inference, Design Trumps Analysis, 2
ANNALS APPLIED STAT. 808, 808 (2008) (“[C]arefully designed and executed randomized
experiments are generally considered to be the gold standard.”).
23. Guido W. Imbens, An Economist’s Perspective on Shadish (2010) and West and
Thoemmes (2010), 15 PSYCHOL. METHODS 47, 48 (2010); see Rubin, supra note 22, at 810–11
(arguing that observational studies should be conceptualized as “approximations of randomized
experiments”).
24. See, e.g., Angus Deaton, Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development,
48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 424, 426 (2010) (“[T]he value of econometric methods cannot and
should not be assessed by how closely they approximate randomized controlled trials.”); Durlauf
& Nagin, supra note 4, at 57 (“[W]e are sympathetic to concerns that the virtues of randomized
experiments have been exaggerated.”); Heckman, supra note 21, at 20 (“Even under ideal
conditions, randomization cannot answer some very basic questions, such as what proportion of a
population benefits from a programme . . . .”); Christopher A. Sims, But Economics Is Not an
Experimental Science, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2010, at 59, 59 (2010) (criticizing experiments as
“rhetorical devices that are often invoked to avoid having to confront real econometric
difficulties”). Many economists, however, advocate greater use of randomized experiments. See,
e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo, The Experimental Approach to Development
Economics, 1 ANN. REV. ECON. 151, 156 (2009) (discussing how experiments can “help[] us
answer conceptual questions . . . that could never be reliably answered in any other way”).
25. Imbens, supra note 23, at 48.
26. See id. (“The goal of such analyses is often to infer the preferences of agents in order to
predict what would happen if the constraints the agents face were changed. Examples of such
changes include imposing taxes on transactions or expanding the set of choices. Underlying this
approach is the notion that the preferences are relatively stable and specifically that they do not
change in response to changes in the constraints.”).
27. See infra notes 45–46, 52–56 and accompanying text (examining two studies, one
exploiting “features of California’s three-strikes law to measure the effect of deterrence,” and the

FISCHMAN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

352

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

11/11/2014 5:57 PM

[Vol. 46

challenge arises out of the fact that these natural sources of variation do
not necessarily coincide with the interventions that would be most
relevant for policy purposes. This challenge is particularly salient when
economists seek to predict the effects of interventions that cannot be
tried in advance. This requires using empirical methods that make
inferences about causal mechanisms, and building theoretical models
that facilitate the extrapolation of these findings to new contexts.28
Many experimentalists limit their research to questions that can be
analyzed by randomized trials, or to observational contexts that can be
plausibly analogized to such trials. Economists do not have this option;
such a constraint would put much of the field off-limits to empirical
inquiry.29 Experimental methods have limited value for studying
economic phenomena such as supply and demand systems, financial
markets, monetary policy, and international trade. As the eminent
econometrician Trygve Haavelmo once remarked, “physicists are very
clever. They confine their predictions to the outcomes of their
experiments. They do not try to predict the course of a rock in the
mountains and trace the development of the avalanche. It is only the
crazy econometrician who tries to do that . . . .”30
Research on the criminal justice system is in many ways like “tracing
the development of the avalanche.”31 Due to ethical and practical
constraints, much of the study of crime and justice is beyond the scope
of experimentation.32 There would be severe ethical concerns, for
example, with studying violent crime in a laboratory setting. Certain
forms of experiments can be conducted in the field,33 but it can be

other “exploiting the effect of sentencing enhancements for offenders who possess a gun during
the commission of a crime”).
28. See Heckman, supra note 21, at 5 (discussing the challenge of “[f]orecasting the impacts
of interventions . . . never historically experienced”).
29. See Clive Granger, Comment, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N
967, 967 (1986) (“[M]any causal questions cannot be tackled within [an experimental]
framework, such as most of those arising in history, economics, sociology, meteorology,
oceanology, political science, anthropology, or law.”).
30. NANCY CARTWRIGHT, THE DAPPLED WORLD: A STUDY OF THE BOUNDARIES OF
SCIENCE 46 (1999) (relating personal conversation with Haavelmo).
31. Id.
32. See Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 4, at 56–57 (discussing practical and ethical limitations
of randomized experiments in the study of criminal justice).
33. See, e.g., JOHN S. GOLDKAMP & MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON, JUDICIAL GUIDELINES FOR
BAIL: THE PHILADELPHIA EXPERIMENT 21 (1984) (randomizing assignment of judges to
treatment groups, to test effects of proposed bail guidelines); Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard
A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM. SOC. REV. 261,
261–62 (1984) (randomizing arrest among eligible domestic violence suspects to measure effect
of arrest on subsequent violence).
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difficult to secure the cooperation of law enforcement, judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys.34 Randomizing the administration
of criminal justice also raises serious ethical questions.35 Because of
these limitations, observational methods will inevitably play a primary
role in the study of criminal justice. The following Part discusses how
econometric methods have proved to be especially useful for studying
the deterrent effect of sanctions, the effects of incarceration, and peer
effects in criminal activity.
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND SANCTIONS
Like economics, empirical research on criminal justice presents many
challenges involving simultaneous causation. Arguably the most
prominent example involves the relationship between crime and
sanctions.36 This two-way causation occurs because sanctions prevent
crime, but high levels of crime spur more intensive enforcement and
punishment. Of course, the causation is not simultaneous in a literal
sense; there are lags between changes in enforcement and changes in
criminal activity, and vice versa. Indeed, some early studies sought to
use this lag to separately identify the effects of crime on punishment
and punishment on crime,37 although this strategy depends on strong
assumptions that are unlikely to be satisfied in practice.38
A more credible approach to measuring the effect of sanctions on
crime is to find instrumental variables—variables that influence the
frequency or intensity of punishment, but do not otherwise have any
impact on criminal behavior.39 Several studies of deterrence in the
34. See Heckman and Smith, supra note 19, at 101–04 (discussing institutional limitations on
social experiments).
35. See Fischman, supra note 16, at 166 (discussing the ethical problems presented by
intentional randomization with regard to the legal profession and adjudication, because
randomization is naturally at odds with “the need for reasoned decisionmaking”); see also Adam
M. Samaha, Randomization and Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2009) (discussing
judicial opposition to randomization).
36. See Nagin, supra note 4, at 84 (noting that since the 1960s, “hundreds of studies have
tested for deterrent effects”).
37. See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Specification Problems, Police Levels,
and Crime Rates, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 609, 619–22 (1996) (discussing time-series methods used to
analyze the relationship between policing and crime).
38. See Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 4, at 50 (arguing that the Marvell and Moody study,
supra note 37, “does not, under any interpretation of causality of which we are aware, provide a
policy relevant measure of the effects of imprisonment”); see also Chalfin & McCrary, supra
note 4, at 10 (arguing that the methodology used by Marvell and Moody “is subject to the same
omitted variables bias issues that plague any least squares regression model and is therefore of
dubious value in establishing causality”).
39. See Franklin M. Fisher & Daniel Nagin, On the Feasibility of Identifying the Crime
Function in a Simultaneous Model of Crime Rates and Sanction Levels, in DETERRENCE AND
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1970s relied on this strategy, but the instrumental variables they used
have been criticized for failing to satisfy the necessary assumptions.40
In recent years, studies have employed more credible instrumental
variables. For example, Steven Levitt used the timing of lawsuits
challenging prison overcrowding to generate instrumental variables for
measuring the impact of prison population on crime levels.41 He found
that an increase in the prison population significantly reduced crime
levels. In another study, William Evans and Emily Owens exploited the
timing of federal grants to local police agencies, under the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, to generate instrumental
variables that influence the level of local policing.42 They found that
increases in police grants generated statistically significant reductions in
a variety of common crimes.43
Economists have also exploited discontinuities in punishment
severity to measure the impact of criminal sanctions. For example,
criminal penalties increase significantly when juveniles reach the age of
majority.44 Thus, offenders just above the age of majority will face
substantially more severe penalties than those just below, although the
two groups will otherwise be similar in terms of relevant characteristics.
Studies that have employed this strategy have reached conflicting
conclusions, with some finding significant deterrent effects45 and some
INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 361,
363 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978) (noting the need to exclude exogenous variables from
one equation in a system of simultaneous equations in order to disentangle the mutual causal
effects between crime and sanctions).
40. See id. at 372–74 (criticizing several early studies of deterrence for using socioeconomic
and demographic variables as instruments, stating that “it is simply not plausible to assume that
such . . . variables do not have a direct effect on crime”).
41. Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from
Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319, 319 (1996). Although Levitt’s research
design was more credible than prior studies, it has not been immune to criticism. See John J.
Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in
the Battle Against Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–14 (1998) (raising questions about Levitt’s
empirical approach and conclusions).
42. See William N. Evans & Emily G. Owens, COPS and Crime, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 181, 182
(2007) (“[T]he variation in timing and size of grants [were used] to test whether the hiring grants
increased the size of police forces.”).
43. See id. at 183 (“[W]e find that additional officers granted through the COPS program
produce statistically significant drops in burglaries, auto thefts, robberies, and aggravated
assaults.”).
44. See Randi Hjalmarsson, Crime and Expected Punishment: Changes in Perceptions at the
Age of Criminal Majority, 11 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 209, 211 (2009) (“It is generally taken as
common knowledge that, conditional on the crime committed, individuals receive a harsher
punishment if sentenced in the criminal courts rather than the juvenile courts.”).
45. See Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1156, 1181
(1998) (“The evidence suggests that juvenile crime is responsive to harsher sanctions.”).
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finding negligible effects.46
Another study exploited features of California’s three-strikes law to
measure the effect of deterrence. The study compared two groups of
former inmates who had been tried for two strikeable offenses.47 The
first group had been convicted of two strikeable offenses while the
second had been convicted of one strikeable offense and one lesser
offense.48 These two groups were roughly comparable in terms of
propensity to engage in criminal conduct, but the first group faced much
more severe sanctions for an additional felony conviction. This study
found significant deterrent effects: those with two strikes were 17% less
likely to be rearrested in the three years following their release.49
Economists have also developed innovative strategies for
disentangling the effects of deterrence and incapacitation. These effects
are difficult to distinguish using aggregate crime data because more
intensive policing and more severe sanctions will typically deter
criminal behavior and also incapacitate a greater number of offenders.50
Distinguishing between them is important as a policy matter because
deterrence is a far less costly form of crime reduction.51
An influential study by Daniel Kessler and Steven Levitt examined
the effect of a California ballot proposition that mandated sentencing
enhancements for certain categories of repeat offenders.52 Their key
46. See Hjalmarsson, supra note 44, at 245 (finding that at the age of majority, perception of
punishment severity is underestimated and evidences little change in delinquent behavior); David
S. Lee & Justin McCrary, The Deterrence Effect of Prison: Dynamic Theory and Evidence 32
(July 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Journal of Economic Literature)
(suggesting that decreased involvement in crime is a function of age, and not a deterrent effect of
increased adult criminal sanctions).
47. See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Does Three Strikes Deter? A Nonparametric
Estimation, 42 J. HUM. RES. 309, 310 (2007) (“We estimate the effect of the law by comparing
the subsequent arrest profiles of criminals who were released with two strikeable offenses with
those released with two trials for strikeable offenses but only one conviction for a strikeable
offense.”).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 316 (“We estimate that the threat of a third strike reduces arrest rates by . . . 17.2
percent . . . .”).
50. E.g., Chalfin & McCrary, supra note 4, at 8 (observing that “research on the effect of
sanctions typically results in a treatment effect that is a function of both deterrence and
incapacitation,” although “clever research designs have been used to identify the effect of an
increase in the severity of a sanction that is unlikely to result in an immediate increase in
incapacitation”).
51. See id. at 2 (“Deterrence is important not only because it results in lower crime but also
because, relative to incapacitation, it is cheap.”).
52. See Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish
Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & ECON. 343, 343–44 (1999) (separating
deterrence from incapacitation by analyzing the immediate effects of increasing incarceration
length for certain crimes).
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insight was that enhancements are added to sentences that would have
been served in any event, so the immediate effect of the ballot
proposition must be due to a deterrent effect.53 By examining short-run
trends in crimes eligible for sentence enhancements and comparing
them with crimes that are not subject to enhancements, they found that
the enhancements resulted in an 8% short-run decrease in crime, which
could be attributed to a deterrent effect.54 More recently, David Abrams
employed a similar strategy, exploiting the effect of sentencing
enhancements for offenders who possess a gun during the commission
of a crime.55 By examining the adoption of these enhancements in
different states at different times, Abrams estimated that these laws
generated a short-run 5% decrease in gun robberies due to deterrence.56
Economists have developed several other approaches for
distinguishing deterrence and incapacitation.
The study of the
California three-strikes law, discussed above,57 clearly measures a
deterrent effect, because it examines individual-level arrest data on
former inmates who are not incarcerated. Similarly, the studies that
examine the discontinuous increase in punishment upon the age of
majority measure the effect of deterrence.58 Another study by Emily
Owens examined a change in Maryland sentencing guidelines that
reduced sentences for many young adult offenders.59 Because this
change in the guidelines was not widely publicized, Owens attributed
the subsequent increase in crime among these offenders to a decrease in
incapacitation.60
53. See id. at 345 (“[B]y looking at changes in crime immediately following the introduction
of a sentence enhancement, it is possible to isolate a pure deterrent effect that is not contaminated
by incapacitation.”).
54. See id. at 357 (finding that crime rates fell by 8.9% immediately after sentence
enhancements were instituted).
55. See David S. Abrams, Estimating the Deterrent Effect of Incarceration Using Sentencing
Enhancements, AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON., Oct. 2012, at 32, 32 (exploiting penalty
differences produced by “add-on gun laws” to isolate deterrent effects).
56. Id. at 45 (finding that gun robbery rates decreased “5 percent within 3 years”).
57. See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 47, at 310 (the study estimated “the effect of the law
by comparing the subsequent arrest profiles of criminals who were released with two strikeable
offenses with those released with two trials for strikeable offenses but only one conviction for a
strikeable offense”).
58. See Hjalmarsson, supra note 44, at 236–44 (characterizing the impact of reaching the age
of criminal majority on incarceration as a deterrent effect).
59. See Emily G. Owens, More Time, Less Crime? Estimating the Incapacitative Effect of
Sentence Enhancements, 52 J.L. & ECON. 551, 552–53 (2009) (evaluating effects of sentence
enhancements using differences in punishment severity among a group of twenty-three- to
twenty-five-year-olds who received reduced sentences).
60. See id. at 556, 558 (taking advantage of unpublicized policy change to estimate amount of
crime reduction within each year of added incarceration).
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In addition to studying the relationship between crime, deterrence,
and incapacitation, economists have also been active in research on peer
effects in criminal activity. This is perhaps surprising, given that peer
effects are rooted in sociological—rather than economic—models of
crime. Here, once again, I believe the explanation lies with the
challenges in dealing with simultaneous causation.
The study of peer effects in empirical economics arguably began with
an influential article by the econometrician Charles Manski, in which he
investigated the challenges in identifying the causal influences of peers
and social groups.61 These challenges are numerous, largely because
social influence among peers typically runs in multiple directions. Peer
effects are even more difficult to measure when group boundaries are
poorly defined,62 when individuals may self-select into groups,63 or
when group members may be subject to common unobserved
influences.64 Thus, empirical studies of peer effects in criminal
behavior must rely on clever strategies to overcome these numerous
obstacles in inference. One study, for example, exploited the “Moving
to Opportunity” field experiment in which a randomized group of lowincome participants were given the opportunity to relocate to low-crime
neighborhoods.65 Because of the random assignment, this research
design was able to disentangle the selection effect from the effect of
peers. It found no significant impact of peers on crime rates by the
study participants.66
Economists have also used detailed information about social
networks to study the influence of peers. One study exploited detailed
surveys in which adolescents identified their closest friends in their peer
network,67 finding that peers have a large influence on an individual’s

61. See Charles F. Manski, Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection
Problem, 60 REV. ECON. STUD. 531, 532 (1993) (discussing difficulties in “distinguish[ing]
among competing hypotheses about the nature of social effects”).
62. See id. at 532 (noting the impossibility of inference when a researcher lacks “prior
information specifying the composition of reference groups”).
63. See id. at 536 (describing the difficulty in measuring peer effects when researchers do not
know how individuals form reference groups).
64. See id. at 532–34 (noting the difficulty in distinguishing peer effects from “correlated
effects” arising from common unobserved influences).
65. See Jens Ludwig & Jeffrey R. Kling, Is Crime Contagious?, 50 J.L. & ECON. 491, 493
(2007) (examining peer effects in criminal behavior by analyzing arrest rates among similar
groups of families randomly assigned to different types of neighborhoods).
66. See id. at 500 (“[T]he pattern of results suggests . . . that there are aspects of residential
neighborhoods that affect crime, particularly racial segregation, but that the role of neighborhood
crime is more limited.”).
67. See Eleonora Patacchini & Yves Zenou, Juvenile Delinquency and Conformism, 28 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 1, 11 (2009) (analyzing the role of conformism on crime using data from the
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propensity to commit petty crimes, but a smaller influence on an
individual’s propensity to commit more serious crimes.68 Another
study examined the assignment of juvenile offenders to correctional
facilities, taking advantage of detailed data on prior offenses committed
by fellow inmates.69 This study also found significant evidence of peer
effects: individuals were more likely to commit particular offenses
following release if they had served with other inmates who had
previously committed the same offenses.70
III. ECONOMIC STUDY OF SENTENCING DISPARITY
The legal process of sentencing criminal offenders may seem even
more remote from the core subject matter of economics. Some research
on the sentencing process draws upon positive political theory, using
rational choice to model the behavior of government actors. For
example, some studies have shown that elected state judges sentence
more harshly when they are up for reelection,71 while others have
examined how federal district judges sentence strategically to avoid
reversal by circuit courts.72 Economists’ research on the sentencing
process is also informed by economic research on litigation and
National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health).
68. See id. at 20 (estimating the effects of social interactions on specific types of crimes).
69. See Patrick Bayer et al., Building Criminal Capital Behind Bars: Peer Effects in Juvenile
Corrections, 124 Q.J. ECON. 105, 106 (2009) (studying whether fellow inmates influence juvenile
offenders’ future criminal behavior).
70. See id. at 126–27 (noting the “reinforcing peer effects” on recidivism).
71. See, e.g., Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An
Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 741, 742 (2013)
(“[S]entencing of serious offenses becomes more severe as elections approach: sentence lengths
increase by around 10% between the beginning and the end of a judge’s political cycle.”); Claire
S. H. Lim, Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from
State Trial Court Judges, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1360, 1392 (2013) (finding that sentencing
patterns of elected judges are more widely varied than those of appointed judges). Political
scientists working within the rational choice paradigm authored the first studies on the interplay
between sentencing and judicial elections. See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The
Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107, 108 (2007)
(“[J]udges in partisan competitive systems sentence significantly more punitively than those in
retention systems.”); Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is
Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 248 (2004) (“[S]entences for . . .
crimes are significantly longer the closer the sentencing judge is to standing for reelection.”).
72. See, e.g., Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter?
The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 406 (2011) (“[W]e interpret
district court sensitivity to standards of review as evidence that district judges are averse to
reversal and respond prospectively to changes in standards of review.”); Max M. Schanzenbach &
Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political
Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 52–53 (2007) (finding that Democratic district
judges depart more frequently from U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in circuits with a majority of
Democratic appointees, as predicted by strategic models of judicial behavior).
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bargaining and by their experience in dealing with simultaneous
causation.73 Because sentences are determined through an interactive
process involving judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys,
understanding how any legal change affects sentencing requires careful
analysis of the strategic interactions among these actors. Thus,
economists have studied prosecutorial motivations,74 how changes in
sentencing law affect plea bargaining,75 and the impact of defense
attorneys.76
Yet some of economists’ most important contributions relate to the
measurement of inter-judge sentencing disparity, which does not
involve rational choice, strategic behavior, or welfare maximization.77
Indeed, it is surprising that economists have been so involved in the
study of disparity, given that they do not otherwise take much interest in
non-utilitarian concerns. I believe that the connection between
economics and the measurement of disparity is primarily
methodological, stemming from economists’ inclination to formalize
73. See supra Part I (discussing econometric methodologies used to make causal inferences
from observations).
74. See, e.g., David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 593 (2005) (suggesting
that prosecutors are motivated to circumvent “three-strikes laws” due to “their own constraints
and preferences”); Richard T. Boylan & Cheryl X. Long, Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career
Objectives of Federal Prosecutors, 48 J.L. & ECON. 627, 649 (2005) (finding “that in districts
with higher private-lawyer salaries, assistant U.S. attorneys are more likely to take cases to trial,”
supporting the “hypothesis that some lawyers work for the government to accumulate human
capital”); Edward L. Glaeser et al., What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An Analysis of the
Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 288 (2000) (finding that federal
prosecutors are more likely to prosecute drug cases involving “high-human-capital individuals,”
suggesting that they are either maximizing social welfare or selecting cases that “offer the best
career returns”); Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, The Role of Discretion in the
Criminal Justice System, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 274 (1998) (suggesting that statutory
increases in sentencing length may have “spillover effects” to similar crimes by virtue of
“prosecutorial maximization”).
75. See, e.g., Ilyana Kuziemko, Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining
in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York’s 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment, 8 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 116, 140 (2006) (“The findings here suggest that the threat of the death penalty
leads more defendants to plead guilty to their original arraignment charges.”).
76. See, e.g., David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case
Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1150 (2007) (finding that
Hispanic public defenders and those with more experience secure shorter sentences for their
clients, but that defenders who attended higher-ranked law schools do not outperform those who
attended lower-ranked schools); James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does
the Lawyer Make? The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154,
199 (2012) (finding that “public defenders in Philadelphia reduce their clients’ murder conviction
rate by 19%” and their “overall expected time served in prison by 24%”).
77. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 16, at 148 n.163 (discussing how research on disparity is
motivated by concerns about “consistency, correctness, determinacy, fairness, predictability, nonarbitrariness, and the rule of law”).
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normative constructs such as surplus or welfare and to develop methods
for making inferences on these constructs from observable data.
Studies of sentencing disparity have traditionally followed one of two
research designs. Some studies follow an experimental approach, using
surveys to ask judges or lay respondents how they would sentence
hypothetical offenders. Other studies rely on observational data,
examining judges’ decisions in actual cases. The application of these
different approaches has divided, to some extent, along disciplinary
lines: much of the psychological literature on sentencing disparity
follows the experimental approach,78 while most economic research is
observational.79 Criminologists have employed both observational and
experimental methods.80
The experimental approach has two primary advantages. First,
researchers can directly compare different judges’ responses to the same
cases. In observational studies, by contrast, researchers can only
measure differences in average sentences. This distinction is important;
comparisons of average sentences may obscure unequal treatment for
individual offenders. Second, researchers can randomly assign different
case facts to different respondents in order to measure the impact of
these facts on sentences. In studying racial disparity, for example,
scholars can manipulate the suspect’s race in a hypothetical scenario,
while keeping other facts unchanged, to assess how judges would treat
white and black offenders differently.81
Many studies of sentencing disparity that predated the United States
Sentencing Guidelines followed the experimental approach. The
78. See, e.g., William Austin & Thomas A. Williams III, A Survey of Judges’ Responses to
Simulated Legal Cases: Research Note on Sentencing Disparity, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
306, 307 (1977) (describing sentencing variation among similarly positioned judges based on five
hypothetical legal cases); Shari Seidman Diamond & Loretta J. Stalans, The Myth of Judicial
Leniency in Sentencing, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 75 (1989) (analyzing sentencing variation among
judges, jurors, and students based on four hypothetical criminal cases); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al.,
Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1204 (2009)
(using surveys to measure judges’ implicit bias and to test whether it affects judges’ decisions in
simulated cases); Peter J. van Koppen & Jan Ten Kate, Individual Differences In Judicial
Behavior: Personal Characteristics and Private Law Decision-Making, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
225, 226 (1984) (testing a written set of protocols that mimicked the decision-making tasks that
civil-law trial judges face in order to identify personal factors that result in sentencing
discrepancy).
79. See infra notes 97–107 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on InterJudge Sentencing Disparity, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 264 (1999) (using
observational methodology); Andreas Kapardis & David P. Farrington, An Experimental Study of
Sentencing by Magistrates, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107, 111 (1981) (using experimental
methodology).
81. See, e.g., Rachlinski et al., supra note 78, at 1211 (describing hypothetical scenarios).
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influential Second Circuit Sentencing Study,82 for example, surveyed
fifty district judges about twenty hypothetical cases, directly comparing
their responses. Because all of the judges were responding to the same
stimuli, the authors could precisely measure the inter-judge variation in
each case. The study also divided the judges randomly into two groups,
modifying the case facts for one of the two groups. By manipulating
the case facts, the authors could measure judges’ responses to such
factors as prior criminal history, guilty pleas, and drug addiction.83
Because all other case factors are kept constant, the study could credibly
estimate the average causal effect of each manipulation.
There are many limitations of the experimental approach, however,
which may explain why such surveys have become less common since
the enactment of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Most
notably, there are serious questions about the external validity of
experiments involving simulated cases.84 As I have argued previously,
“[s]implified scenarios in written questionnaires may not present the
same stimuli as actual cases: judges are not exposed to advocacy from
both sides, they are not required to write opinions justifying their
decisions, and they do not need to consider the impact of their
judgments on actual parties.”85 There is also no guarantee that judges
will willingly participate in such studies or that they will approach them
with the requisite seriousness.86 One prominent critique of the Second
82. ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES 1 (1974).
83. Id. at 45–53.
84. See, e.g., James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before
and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 279 (1999) (“It is quite
difficult . . . for a simulation to reconstruct the full depth of information available to a judge in a
real case.”); John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An
Ethnography of Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. REV. 467, 474–75
(1988) (“One can never claim with certainty [that experiments] have captured all the elements of
a real case, nor can one be sure that subjects will respond to stimuli in the same way as they
would in the courtroom.”); Shari Seidman Diamond & Hans Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study
of Sentence Disparity and its Reduction, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 116 (1975) (describing the
differences between sentencing simulations and real decisions); Hofer et al., supra note 80, at 264
(“[H]ypothetical situations may be so different from actual sentencing that the results cannot be
generalized to the real world.”); Vladimir J. Konečni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of
Research in Legal Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 65 (1979) (“We believe . . . that the
results of research efforts that deal with the real-world, consequential legal decisions are far more
informative than those that deal with simulated decisions.”); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1377, 1394 (1998) (writing that “simulation experiments with judges” suffer from “an
inauthenticity that fails to mirror the real world of adjudication and judicial decisionmaking”).
85. Joshua B. Fischman, Measuring Inconsistency, Indeterminacy, and Error in Adjudication,
16 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 40, 59 (2014).
86. See id. (noting that “judges may be loath to cooperate, especially if the research could
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Circuit Sentencing Study reports that some of the judges involved in the
study treated it as a “joke.”87 Whatever difficulties there may have been
in securing judges’ participation before the Guidelines, it is much more
difficult now that judges are acutely aware of the policy implications of
such research. Finally, while surveys can examine how judges would
respond to different scenarios, they cannot account for the potential
reactions of other actors, such as prosecutors, defense attorneys, or
appellate courts.
Observational studies that examine actual judicial decisions can
provide greater authenticity, but these studies also have serious
limitations. Measuring inter-judge disparity becomes much more
difficult because judges’ decisions are not simultaneously observable in
the same cases. One approach has been to compare judges’ sentences
for offenders who appear similar in terms of observable
characteristics.88 This approach, however, is less convincing, because
judges typically have more information about particular offenders than
sentencing researchers. Thus, offenders who appear to be similar in the
data may differ in relevant ways that are observable to the judges.
In recent years, many studies have exploited the random assignment
of cases to judges in order to compare average sentences among judges.
This approach combines the authenticity of real-world cases with the
credibility of experimental design, but it also gives rise to several
challenging questions. First, how should one measure inter-judge
disparity when one cannot observe different judges deciding the same
cases? This question has both normative and statistical elements:
disparity itself is a normative construct,89 but researchers must
determine how to make inferences about disparity on the basis of
observable variables.
Second, how can one determine from observational data whether
disparity increased or decreased as the result of a reform? In my view,
this is one of the most important challenges in research on sentencing
disparity. As long as criminal sentencing involves human judgment,
there will inevitably be some degree of inter-judge disparity. We
should not ask whether such disparity exists; it surely does. Rather, we
support reforms that the judges oppose”).
87. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 109 (1998) (discussing the lack of seriousness with which judges approached
experimental study and the lack of detail in the scenarios).
88. See Hofer et al., supra note 80, at 268–70 (describing studies that measure disparity by
matching offenders according to observable characteristics).
89. See Fischman, supra note 16, at 148–54 (discussing the values motivating research on
inter-judge disparity).
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should measure the size of such disparities and determine whether
particular reforms have succeeded in mitigating them. Reducing interjudge disparity was one of the primary goals of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines,90 and yet we still do not understand very well if
the Guidelines succeeded in this regard, or how disparity changed after
United States v. Booker, which rendered the Guidelines advisory.91
The earliest empirical studies of sentencing recognized the
importance of random assignment. A series of annual reports published
by New York City magistrates in 1914,92 for example, compared the
magistrates’ conviction rates in different types of cases, along with their
tendencies to apply various forms of punishment.93 Although case
assignment was not explicitly randomized, the magistrates rotated
among the various courts throughout the year, so that “it [could]
reasonably be assumed that each magistrate handle[d] practically the
same class of cases as those handled by his colleagues.”94 A 1933 study
by a team of criminologists95 applied a similar approach, exploiting
randomization to study inter-judge disparity in criminal sentencing in
New Jersey.96
It was not until the 1990s, however, that sentencing researchers
exploited random assignment to apply modern statistical inference in
disparity studies. In a study of sentencing in three federal districts, the
90. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 8 (1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE
INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES] (“The overriding . . . concern with the existing system . . . was
directed at the apparent unwarranted disparity and inequality of treatment in sentencing of similar
defendants who had committed similar crimes.”); Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4 (1988)
(describing one of the primary purposes of the Guidelines as “reduc[ing] ‘unjustifiably wide’
sentencing disparity” (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3182, 3221)).
91. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (making the Guidelines advisory by
severing two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
92. N.Y. BD. OF CITY MAGISTRATES, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CITY MAGISTRATES’ COURTS
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRST DIVISION) FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1914
(1914).
93. See id. at 48–67 (detailing and comparing magistrates’ discharged cases regarding cruelty
to animals, disorderly conduct, intoxication, peddling, motor-vehicle offenses, vagrancy,
violation of corporation ordinances, and violation of sanitary law).
94. George Everson, The Human Element in Justice, 10 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 90, 91
(1919).
95. Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges,
23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933).
96. See id. at 813 (“Since the rule is that there is no selection of the cases which the judge is to
sentence but that the sentencing of a particular prisoner by a particular judge is a matter of chance
(the judges rotate), it is obvious that, by chance, each judge should get an equal number of cases
whose sentences would normally be long or short.”).
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economist Joel Waldfogel constructed tests to verify random
assignment and to assess the significance of inter-judge disparity.97 In a
second article, Waldfogel proposed an approach for quantifying interjudge disparity.98 He started with the assumption that the average
sentence given by judges in a district was appropriate99—an assumption
used by the Sentencing Commission in drafting the Guidelines100—and
then measured the squared deviation between actual sentences and
average sentences.101 This method, however, could not be used for
statistical inference or to measure the significance of changes in
disparity over time.
A 1999 article by James Anderson, Jeffrey Kling, and Kate Stith
(“AKS”) developed a sophisticated econometric technique for testing
whether changes in inter-judge disparity are statistically significant.102
The importance of this contribution warrants emphasis: assessing the
impact of the Guidelines themselves—or measuring the impact of
Booker—entails measuring whether there was a significant change in
disparity. AKS developed tests for assessing whether changes in the
distribution of average sentences were statistically significant,103 and
estimated the significance of these changes for a series of consecutive
years from 1982 until 1993.104 Yet no other study has ever followed the
AKS approach. In part, this may be due to the fact that sentencing data
with individual judge identifiers has not been widely available.105 Yet
97. Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing: Evidence from
Three Districts (D.Ct., S.D.N.Y., N.D.Cal.), 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 151, 151 (1991).
98. Joel Waldfogel, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Justify Empirically Based Sentencing
Guidelines?, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 293, 294 (1998).
99. See id. (“[W]e treat the difference between the overall average sentence for an offender
with given circumstances and each judge’s average sentence for an offender with the same
circumstances as the only source of unwarranted disparity.”).
100. See SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 90,
at 13–19 (describing how the Sentencing Commission used empirical estimates of average
sentences to determine appropriate sentences under the Guidelines).
101. See Waldfogel, supra note 98, at 294 (“We evaluate actual sentences by their squared
deviation from appropriate sentences, and we measure appropriate sentences by assuming that,
except for measurable inter-judge disparity, discretionary sentences are appropriate.”).
102. Anderson et al., supra note 84, at 279–87 (developing a zero-inflated negative binomial
model in which judges are represented by random effects that are correlated across two periods).
103. See id. at 282–83 (describing how their approach enables inference on changes in
disparity by “incorporat[ing] the estimation of the judge effects directly in a statistical model of
the underlying distribution of sentence lengths”).
104. See id. at 295–96 & fig.2 (reporting estimates of changes in inter-judge sentencing
disparity between 1982 and 1993).
105. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines:
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 740–43 (2008)
(discussing how the U.S. Sentencing Commission has refused to release federal sentencing data
with judge identifiers).
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it may also be due to the technical complexity of the AKS method, and
the fact that it has not been implemented in a user-friendly form.106
Two more recent studies found evidence that inter-judge disparity
increased in the wake of Booker, but these studies did not address
whether these increases in disparity were significant.107
Even the AKS method, which I believe to be the best method
developed thus far for measuring disparity, has one important
limitation: it only measures changes in average disparity. As with all
observational approaches to measuring disparity, it is impossible to
know how different judges would decide the same case. This is
important because comparisons of average sentences could potentially
mask a sizeable degree of arbitrariness in sentencing. Two judges could
be lenient toward different types of offenders, yet have the same
average sentence. In fact, some experimental studies have found
substantial disparities in judges’ proposed sentences for particular
offenders, even among judges with similar average sentences.108 One
promising approach would be to combine observational and
experimental methods.109 Surveys could be used to measure the degree
to which judges would sentence similarly in the same cases, while data
on actual sentences in randomly assigned cases would provide the most
credible estimates of changes in judges’ average sentences over time.
IV. THOUGHTS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The preceding discussion highlights some important advances in
sentencing research, but also serves as a reminder that much work
remains to be done. Indeed, it is sobering how little we know about

106. The AKS model was implemented in MATLAB. Anderson et al., supra note 84, at 293
n.51. MATLAB is a technical computing language that can be used to “analyze data, develop
algorithms, and create models and applications.” MATLAB, MATHWORKS, http://www.math
works.com/products/matlab/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
107. See Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2010) (describing an increase in disparity in one district court, but not formally
testing or analyzing change in disparity); Crystal S. Yang, Have Inter-Judge Sentencing
Disparities Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 101 (2014) (employing a simplified version of the AKS approach to provide confidence
intervals for a measure of disparity, but not testing the significance of changes over time).
108. See, e.g., Fischman, supra note 85, at 53 (discussing studies that “[find] that only a small
component of sentencing disparities can be attributed to differences in harshness and leniency,
and that much of the inter-judge variation is due to heterogeneous reactions to different types of
cases”).
109. See id. at 58–59 (“One approach would entail surveying the judges regarding their
responses to hypothetical cases . . . using a set of cases that are representative of [certain types of
case characteristics]. Because the judges’ responses would be simultaneously observable, it
would be possible to estimate measures of association among the judges’ decisions.”).
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many fundamental questions relating to sentencing policy. Although I
have highlighted some studies that generated credible estimates of the
effect of deterrence, such work is still far too rare, and it is difficult to
draw broad conclusions from this body of research.110 Similarly, we
understand very little about how the Guidelines affect inter-judge
disparity, even though concerns about disparity were a prime motivation
for the Guidelines.111
In conclusion, I offer two brief suggestions for sentencing research.
First, sentencing scholarship would benefit from greater clarity
regarding its normative goals. Empirical research is positive, but the
questions that motivate this research are inherently normative.112 We
do not study sentencing out of idle curiosity; we study sentencing to
address policy questions, such as whether to reenact binding guidelines
or reform existing guidelines. For this reason, we must be precise about
how empirical findings relate to policy conclusions. This is an
especially important concern in the study of sentencing disparity,113
where the object of interest—the measure of disparity—is itself a
normative construct.
Second, there is a need for richer behavioral models of criminal and
judicial behavior.
When reforms cannot be tested prior to
implementation, we must necessarily rely on models to predict the
effects of such reforms. While rational choice has an important role to
play in modeling criminal behavior, more realistic models of criminal
behavior could incorporate psychological and sociological perspectives.
Similarly, richer models of judicial and prosecutorial behavior are
important for predicting the impact of proposed sentencing reforms. In
recent years, judges and scholars have debated proposals for modified
sentencing guidelines to replace the original guidelines invalidated in
Booker.114 Because any new guidelines will necessarily differ from the
110. Cf. Nagin, supra note 4, at 84–87 (arguing that only six studies of deterrence generated
convincing results, and that the findings are heterogeneous).
111. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
112. See Fischman, supra note 16, at 156 & n.196 (noting that empirical social science
typically has normative motivations).
113. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Prepared Testimony of Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair, United States Sentencing
Commission, Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 55–60 (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Testimony/20111012_S
aris_Testimony.pdf (recommending steps to strengthen the federal sentencing guidelines); Amy
Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1681 (2012) (arguing against
any efforts to enact binding guidelines); William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three
Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the
Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26 J.L. & POL. 305, 340–53 (2011) (describing a proposal
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original guidelines, evaluating such a proposal entails predicting how
judges would sentence under a counterfactual policy. It might be
possible to use surveys to ask judges how they would behave under a
new proposal, but judges may be loath to participate, and such surveys
might lack reliability.115 An economic approach would involve
proposing a judicial utility function, estimating its parameters using
historical data,116 and using these estimates to predict judges’ behavior
under the proposed guidelines scheme. A richer model could
incorporate the strategic responses of prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and other relevant actors.
CONCLUSION
The study of sentencing is a multidisciplinary endeavor, involving
collaboration among lawyers, criminologists, and social scientists from
various disciplines. Economic methods are not necessarily superior to
those of other disciplines, but they are well suited for addressing many
questions of importance to the study of sentencing. Like economics, the
study of sentencing presents many challenges, requiring researchers to
disentangle multiple causal influences from observational data. Many
pressing policy questions may not have clear answers, but given the
stakes involved, we have no choice but to do our best.

for simplified guidelines).
115. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about the reliability
of surveys in sentencing research).
116. For a preliminary approach to estimating a sentencing judge’s utility function, see
generally Todd Sorensen et al., Race and Gender Differences Under Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 256 (2012).

